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Summary findings
Using  factory-level  data provided by China's  National  *  The current regulatory  system  provides  an economic
Environmental  Protection  Agency  (NEPA)  and the  incentive  to abate by charging  a levy  on pollution  that
Tianjin  Environmental  Protection  Bureau,  Dasgupta,  exceeds  the standard.  But  the results  of this analysis
Huq, Wheeler,  and Zhang estimate  the costs  of water  suggest  that changing  to a full emissions  charge  system
pollution  abatement  for Chinese  industry.  Using  their  would  greatly  reduce overall  abatement  costs.  For the
econometric  results,  they analyze  the cost-effectiveness  of  sample  of 260 factories,  the current overall  abatement
current pollution  control policy  in China  - and  rate could be attained under a charge system  with
conclude  that:  present-value  savings  of $344 million.  At a cost
* For each pollutant, marginal  abatement  costs  exhibit  equivalent  to that of the current system,  uniform
great differences  by sector, scale,  and degree  of  pollution  charges  would  produce much better
abatement.  Ratios of 20:1 in each dimension  are not  environmental  quality.
uncommon.  Approach:  To measure  the costs  of abatement,  they
* The benefits  of stricter discharge  standards  should  use  joint abatement  cost functions  that relate total costs
be weighed  carefully  against  the costs.  For a sample  of  to treatment  volume  and the simultaneous  effect  of
260 factories,  a shift  across  the existing  range of  reductions  in suspended  solids,  chemical  oxygen
standards  entails  a present-value  difference  in abatement  demand,  biological  oxygen  demand,  and other
costs  of $330 million.  pollutants.  Tests  of alternative  functional  forms  suggests
* Emissions  charges  as low  as $1 a ton would  be  that a simple  (constant  elasticity)  model  fits the data as
sufficient  to induce 80 percent abatement  of suspended  well as a complex  (translog)  models  does, permitting
solids  for cost-minimizing  factories.  Charges  of $3 a ton,  sophisticated  policy  experiments  with relatively  simple
$15 a ton, and $30 a ton would  be sufficient  to induce  calculations.
90 percent abatement  of suspended  solids,  chemical
oxygen  demand,  and biological  oxygen  demand,
respectively.
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In this paper, we use factory-level data provided by China's National Environmental
Protection Agency (NEPA) and the Tianjin Environmental Protection Bureau to estimate
water pollution abatement costs for Chinese industry.  We utilize joint abatement cost
functions which relate total costs to treatment volume and the simultaneous effect of
reductions in Suspended Solids, Chemical Oxygen Demand, Biological Oxygen Demand
and other pollutants.  Tests of alternative functional forms suggest that a very sirnple
(constant elasticity) model fits the data as well as a complex (translog) model, permitting
sophisticated policy experiments vith relatively simple calculations.
Using our econometric results, we analyze the cost-effectiveness of current pollution
control policy in China. Our basic conclusions are as follows:
*  The benefits of stricter discharge standards should be weighed carefully against the
costs.  For our samnple  of 260 factories, a shift across the existing range of standards
entails a present-value difference  of $330 million in abatement costs.
- Emissions charges as low as $1.00/ton would be sufficient to induce 80% abatement of
suspended solids for cost-minimizing  factories.  Charges of $3, $15 and $30 per ton
would be sufficient to induce 90% abatement of TSS, COD and BOD.
- The current regulatory system provides an economic incentive to abate by charging a
levy on pollution in excess of the standard. However, our results suggest that changing
to a full emissions charge system would greatly reduce overall abatement costs.  For
the 260 factories in our sample, the current overall abatement rate could be attained
under a charge system at a reduced annual cost whose present value is $344 million.
At a cost equivalent to that of the current system, uniform pollution charges could
produce much higher environmental quality.I1. INTRODUCTION
Although the potential benefits of industrial pollution control are clear in many developing
countries, policy makers continue to worry about the costs.  It has been difficult  to address this
concern explicitly,  because little empirical evidence has been available. In addition, information
about abatement costs would be extremely useful for the design of cost-effective regulation.
In this paper, we use a new plant-level database to produce such infornation  for China. We
estimate a joint abatement cost function for major water pollutants, and use the results to evaluate
the economic efficiency  of current regulation. We also use the econometric results to simulate the
impact of an emissions charge system.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides an introduction to industrial pollution
control issues in China.  Section 3 uses the new dataset to develop measures of abatement and
compliance for our sample of factories.  In Sections 4 and 5, we specify and estimate an
econometric model of abatement costs which is appropriate for simultaneous control of several
pollutants.  Section 6 discusses the policy implications  of our results, while Section 7 summarizes
the paper.
2. INDUSTRL4L POLLUTION  CONTROL  IN CHINA
Industrial air and water pollution in China have been major concerns for the past two decades.  A
recent assessment by the Chinese Research Academy of Environmenital  Sciences (CRAES) has
identified industrial pollution as the source of approximately 70% of China's total environmental
pollution.  Current estimates of human health damage from urban air pollution are very high for
some areas.'
Such high levels of damage are primarily due to the rapid growth of pollution-intensive  industries,
not to lack of effort by China's environmental regulators.  Indeed, the pollution control program
of China's  National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) and the provincial Environmental
Protection Bureaus (EPBs) is probably the most extensive in the developing world.  According to
CRAES (1994), pollution abatement in the past decade has been sufficient to maintain at least
constant levels of industrial waste water discharge and flue dust emission from coal combustion.
Total estimated emissions of suspended particulates have dropped from 13.5 million tons to 5.8
million  tons.  At the same time, industrial output has approximately quadrupled.  The pollution
intensity of output in certain key emissions categories has dropped sharply since 1985, at least in
factories which are regulated by the environmental agencies.'
' See CRAES  (1994),  X. Xu (1994),  and Z. Xu (1995).
2 One cautionary  note is warranted  here: regulatory  coverage  is bv no means universal. It seems  to be particularly
sparse  for Township  and Village Enterprises.  the fastest-growing  ownership  class.
IThis record is impressive, but several factors suggest that the next decade will pose major
challenges for NEPA and the EPBs. Continued rapid decline in pollution intensity will be
necessary just to stay even with the pace of industrial growth.  Moreover, recent findings on
pollution-related health damage suggest that considerable improvement in ambient quality would
be appropriate.  Faced with the simultaneous need to reduce pollution and increase industrial
output and employment, the Chinese government has become very interested in cost-effective
regulation. The current pollution control system is under scrutiny, because its peculiar mix of
regulations and economic incentives bears little resemblance to a conventional emissions charge
system.
NEPA regulations specify effluent standards by sector, and a schedule of fees (the pollution levy)
to be paid by any enterprise whose effluent discharge exceeds the mandated standard. With the
approval of NEPA, local areas may raise both standards and fees above national levels. Levies are
charged only on the 'worst case' pollutant from each source. 3 This incentive system is
supplemented by more traditional pollution control measures.  Under the 'Three Simultaneous
Steps' system, new enterprises are required to construct abatement facilities with capacity
sufficient to meet the relevant effluent standards.
Chinese regulators are debating whether this mixed-instrument regime should be changed to a
conventional emissions charge system.  Since transition costs are likely to be high, there is strong
interest in estimating the potential net gain from such a change. Theoretically, the gain could be
substantial. Commonly-cited simulation results from the OECD economies suggest that total costs
in a standards-based system can be several times those in a charge-based system. 4 For China, a
well-informed  judgment should be based on much better knowledge about actual abatement costs.
3.  THE DATA
Our data are drawn from two sources: (1) the China Monitoring Station in Beijing, which
monitors the 3000 factories currently rated as China's largest potential polluters;  (2) the Tianjin
Environmental Protection Bureau, which monitors industrial facilities in the Tianjin urban region.
The available  data bases include information on production, emissions by pollutant, abatement,
abatement costs, and pollution-related penalties such as pollution levies, fines and compensation
paid for damage.  Relevant variables for the present study are summarized in Table 3.1.
For this exercise, NEPA has provided us with 1994 data for 200 factories scattered across China's
urban/industrial areas. The Tianjin EPB has supplied data for 60 additional plants.  The data base
provides separate information for each emissions source.  Many facilities have multiple sources,
yielding a total sample size of 370 obsrvations.  Although the data base is exceptionally complete,
it records only three pollutants abated for each source.  This is probably sufficient for most actual
3 For more extensive discussion of the pollution levy svstem. see Wang and Wheeler (1996).
4 See Wheeler (1992)
2cases, but in theory it could cause  some  truncation  problems.  We have  estimated  total abatement
costs for each treatment  point  by adding  operations  and maintenance  expenditure  to annualized
services  from abatement  capital.  5 Data on treatment  volume,  influent  concentration  and effluent
concentration  are taken directly  from the recorded  measurements.
The current  state of compliance  in China  is highlighted  by the range of variation  in abatement
activity  recorded  in the data base. As Table  3.2b indicates,  end-of-pipe  abatement  ranges  from 0
to 100%,  with  median  abatment  of standard  water pollutants  (BOD, COD,  TSS) in the 70-80%/o
range and first-quartile  abatement  around 50%. The willingness  of many  plants  to report non-
compliant  discharges  to NEPA  indicates  that the levy  system  is working  as intended. Excess
discharges  are subjected  to a fee under  the levy  system,  but they are not illegal.
China's  abatement  statistics  compare  very favorably  with those of wealthier  Southeast  Asian
economies  such  as Indonesia  and Philippines,  whose median  abatement  activity  is closer  to 50%
(Hettige,  et. al., 1995). Table  3.2a shows  that water pollution  would  be much  worse without
existing  control. Influent  (pre-abatement  wastestream)  concentrations  for most plants greatly
exceed  Chinese  discharge  standards  (Table  3.3). Median  influent  concentrations  for TSS, COD
and BOD  (567, 850 and 264 mg/l,  respectively),  are far above discharge  standards  for the lowest-
quality  water bodies  in both Guangdong  and  Beijing. As Table  3.3b shows,  median  effluent
concentrations  are much  closer  to existing  standards  for medium-low  quality  water bodies, and
1  st-quartile  concentrations  are generally  in the medium-high  quality  range. However,  a large
number  of plants  remain  out of compliance.
Tables  3.2 and 3.3 show  that Chinese  factory  managers  in polluting  sectors  must contend  with
great diversity  in both process  emissions  and location-sensitive  concentration  standards.  Their
abatement  decisions,  and the overall  level  of abatement  costs, will  be significantly  affected  by the
degree of pollution  control  necessary  to bring  their emissions  into compliance  with prevailing
standards.
4. THE DETERMINANTS  OF ABATEMENT COSTS
Traditionally,  abatement  cost estimates  have  been  based  on plants' reported  direct costs of
installing  and operating  pollution  control  equipment. Coupled  with  information  about the benefits
of reducing  pollution,  such  cost estimates  can provide  a basis for setting  sensible  regulatory
standards. Until  recently,  the scarcity  of appropriate  plant-level  data has prevented  detailed
empirical studies of average and marginal abatement costs by pollutant. 6 Policy analyses have
5 We  have  used  an interest  rate  of 10%  for  this  exercise.
6 For other recent  work  oii this issue.  see Hartman.  Wheeler  and Singh (1995)  and Mundle,  et. al., (1994).
3frequently developed abatement cost estimates from engineering models. However, failure to rely
7
on behavioral data has led to considerable estimation errors.
While environmental economists and policymakers have focused almost exclusively  on direct
abatement costs, we recognize that these provide an incomplete measure of the cost of pollution
reduction. Firms can adjust to the threat of higher pollution-related costs along many dimensions,
including new process technology, pollution control equipment, improved efficiency, and
allocation of more resources to legal representation or negotiation.  At the plant level, all these
options will register as changes in the scale and mix of inputs and, consequently, total production
costs. Thus, pollution control will have an impact on conventionally-defined  total factor
productivity (TFP) which may be significantly  different than directly-reported abatement costs.8
In this study, we focus on direct abatement costs because the available data do not permit
estimation of a TFP-based cost function.
4.1 The Direct Abatement Cost Function
Industrial facilities can abate pollution by scaling back polluting activities or by diverting
resources to cleanup. In either case, pollution reduction will entail costs. 9 Moreover, diminishing
returns will apply: more resources will have to be devoted to cleaning up each additional unit of
pollutant. Hence, the marginal abatement cost (MAC) function slopes upward from right to left as
pollution falls. The position and slope of the MAC function are affected by factors such as the
scale and sectoral composition of production; the average operating efficiency  of the firm; the
available process technologies; and the efficiency  of waste treatment technologies. For any given
level of pollution, more costly pollution control is associated with rightward movement of the
MAC function.
Conceptually, abatement cost functions are dual to abatement functions which relate inputs of
capital, labor, energy and materials to pollution reduction.  Abatement processes frequently
reduce more than one air or water pollutant, so joint cost function estimation is appropriate.  For
example, Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD), Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD), and Suspended
Solids (SS) can all be reduced by treatment in common facilities. These joint equipment
1 A useful  illustration  is provided  by the trading  price for SO 2 emissions  permits  under  the U.S. Clean  Air Act
(Hamilton,  1994).  Using engineering  models.  the U.S. Goverrunent  forecast  a price  around  $600/ton  before  the
trading system  was instituted. In fact. permits  have  recentlv  traded  at prices around  $150/ton.  Recent  plant-level
econometric  work  by Hartman, Wheeler  and Singh  (1995)  on S02  reduction  costs in the U.S. has yielded  estimates
much  closer  to the latter figure.
8 In an econometric  study  of TFP impact  for several  U.S.  industries.  Gray  and Shadbegian  (1993)  find that
regulation  imposes  a TFP loss approximatelv  three times higher than the reported  direct  cost of abatement.
9 There is currently  an important  debate,  initiated  by Porter (1993).  on whether  or not firms  can be made more
profitable  by  forcing them to undertake  pollution  control activities. In a verv  simple  static framework  of analysis,
Oates et al. (1993) have shown  Porter's argument  to be * Tong,  and point out that the route  from pollution
abatement  to higher profits  is much more  complex  than mav have  been tlhought.  Ultimately,  this is an empirical
question.
4requirements are associated with common use of skilled and unskilled labor, energy and materials.
4.2 Cost Function Specification
For k pollutants, the environmental engineering literature suggests that an appropriate joint cost
function for plant i should include the following variables:
(4. 1) Ci = f  (Wi,  , Mj,  X)
where
Cj:  Total annual cost of abatement for the plant
Wj:  Total annual wastewater volume
Ei,,/I,,: Vector of effluent/influent ratios for n pollutants, which can be interpreted either as
concentration ratios or volume ratios (since waste water volume is constant across influent
and effluent for each plant, it cancels out of the concentration ratio).
Mj:  Vector of input prices at location j
Xi:  Vector of relevant plant characteristics (sector, age, ownership, productive
efficiency,  etc.)
For the kth pollutant, the marginal abatement cost function is given by:
r(W,  Ei  , M,X,)
(4.2)  i  i
aEik  atik
We exclude the vector of input prices, since appropriate cross-regional price indices are not
presently available  to us.  '0 We specify a second-order quadratic approximation to the general
cost function (or translog function) as follows:
InC =  ao  + a1 InW +  a  InW 2 +  fi  In;  +  fiy  InI  In  W
(4.3)  y~~j  ln~L)  + /Jij ~~ln~±~]  +  . ei
i=lj  lflj\ 7 .)  ~  1=  i=j=
i=1  j1  j  (i)  .s,  iLiZe
10  This  exclusion  increases  random  estimation  error.  but  should  not  bias  the  results. As  Table  5.1 shows,  our
results  are  very  robust  in any  case.
5where E is a vector of random disturbances.
Abatement in Equation (4.3) is measured by E/I, which reflects the percent reduction in the
pollutant as it passes from pre-abatement influent concentration I to post-abatement effluent
concentration E. To our knowledge, such a function has not previously been fitted to data for
either developed or developing countries.  1 In this paper, we fit joint abatement cost functions for
four water pollutants (BOD, COD, SS, and other pollutants).
5. ECONOMETRIC  RESULTS
We have fitted the general abatement cost function specified in (4.3) to sectorally-pooled data,
excluding input price indices because the relevant cross-region data are not available. The results,
reported in Table 5.1, include nested tests on four specifications: full translog (Equation 4.3);
restricted translog (Equation 4.3 minus interactions between (E/[) ratios and treatment volume);
log-log with quadratic scale effects for treatment; and simple log-log (constant elasticity).
Standard F-tests on parameter restrictions (reported at the bottom of the table) suggest that the
more complex, variable elasticity models do not explain observed behavior better than a simple
constant-elasticity (log-log) specification. We therefore focus on results for the latter.
In the log-log regression, all the key parameters have the expected signs and high levels of
statistical significance. The degree of fit to the data is quite good for a sample of this size
(Adjusted R2 =  .51).  The results suggest strong abatement scale economies, since the cost
elasticity of treatment volume is approximately .4 and the standard error of the estimate is very
small (t= 12.39). Controlling for treatment scale, abatement cost increases with degree of
abatement for all four pollutants (TSS, COD, BOD, Other).'2 All four estimates are statistically
significant: BOD has the largest cost elasticity (-.33), followed by COD (-.27), TSS (-.21) and
Other Pollutants (-.1 1). The sum of these elasticities is not significantly  different from unity,
suggesting that abatement cost responds unit-elastically to simultaneous reductions of all water
emissions.
We have included sectoral dummy variables in the regression to control for the possibility that
sector effects are significant even after influent concentrations have been accounted for. The
results in Table 5.1 confirm that these effects remain highly significant. Controlling for scale and
degree of abatement, Oil Refining is relatively high-cost; Food Processing and Iron and Steel are
relatively low-cost.
It is also plausible to suppose that plant ownership and age could have significant positive effects
on abatement costs, ceteris paribus.  State-owned enterprises are often assumed to be relatively
" Empirical  work  on simpler  specifications  has  just begun  for developing  countries. For recent  work on abatement
costs in Indian pulp mills,  see Mundle  (1994).
12 The effluent/influent  ratio is (I -% abatement),  so the expected  sign in our regressions  is negative.
6inefficient,  and older enterprises  may  use process  technologies  which  are less  well-suited  for end-
of-pipe  abatement. We have  tested both hypotheses,  but have  found no significant  impact  for
either  factor.
Another  possible  problem  with our results  lies in the inclusion  of both Chemical  Oxygen  Demand
and Biological  Oxygen  Demand  in the regression.13  Both are measures  of organic  water pollution
(COD  also incorporates  the impact  of other contaminants  on the rate of oxidation  by micro-
organisms  in the water). Reduction  of COD  always  entails  some  reduction  of BOD and
conversely,  so inclusion  of both variables  in the same  regression  runs some  risk of 'double-
counting.'  To test the implications,  we have  run the same  regression  without  BOD; the result is
reported in Table  5.1c. It suggests  a conventional  effect  of exclusion  bias  (the estimated
parameter  of LCOD  is substantially  higher),  but nothing  more. All  other results in the regression
are practically  identical  to the full constant-elasticity  result. We conclude  that inclusion  of both
BOD and COD  in the regression  is appropriate. In fact,  the similarity  of estimated  parameters
suggests  that higher  overall  precision  could be gained  by constraining  them  to equality.
Finally,  we have  controlled  for potential  simultaneity  in the joint determination  of emissions  and
abatement  costs. Since  these  two variables  are theoretically  jointly-determined  in the cost-
minimiization  exercise  of the plant,  the abatement  parameter  estimates  may  be biased. To check
this possibility,  we have re-estimated  the equation  using two-stage  least squares. In the first-stage
regressions,  discharge  of each  pollutant  (the numerator  of E/I) is regressed  on six variables:  Total
plant employment,  treatment  scale, influent  volume  for the pollutant,  age of plant, a dummy
variable  for state ownership,  and the relevant  sectoral  concentration  standard. The results are
reported in the second column  of Table 5.1  c. Aside  from a somewhat  higher  estimated  elasticity
for COD,  they are remarkably  similar  to the OLS results. We conclude  that simultaneity  is not a
serious  problem  in this case.
To consider  the policy  implications  of our results,  we use the constant-elasticity  estimates  from
Table  5.  lb. These reflect  the following  total and  marginal  cost equations:
(5.1)  C=e  aowal  i
(5.2)  eE  = gj  eaow  Hal  4  ]  Ei  A
13  We are indebted to our colleague Shakeb Afsah for this point.
7For a pollutant-specific ernissions  charge p, conversion of (5.2) to an emissions response function
is straightforward under the assumption of cost minimization. For the first of four pollutants, a
cost-minimizing  plant should equate pi to (dC/dE,), given the volume of wastewater and influent
for pollutant 1. This yields the following emissions equation:
(5.3) E 1 =  file ao]  1l  plIA  ,1I-l  rl  EIi  81  fl
1  1  ~~~~i=2  i
In the following section, we use Equations (5.1) - (5.3) to analyze the cost-effectiveness of the
current system.
6. ABATEMENT COSTS AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES  aN CHINA
6.1 Marginal  Cost Variations  by Sector, Scale and  Abatement  Rate
In environmental economics, assumed variation in plant-level marginal abatement cost schedules
fuels the standard critique of regulation based on uniform end-of-pipe emissions standards.  The
received theory suggests that use of market-based instruments, such as emissions charges or
tradable permits, will realize significant  efficiency  gains by confronting all polluters with an
identical 'price of polluting' at the margin. Of course, the theory says nothing about the actual
magnitude of variations in marginal  abatement costs.  In practice, these have to be large enough to
convince policy makers that the efficiency  benefits of market-based instruments will outweigh the
costs of the transition to a new regulatory regime.
Our results suggest that the magnitudes are very large.  In Table 6.1 we draw on Equation (5.2)
to estimate marginal costs of abatement (in annual dollars/ton) by pollutant, for plants in five
sectors (Food, Textiles, Paper, Oil Refining,  and Chemicals) and three abatement size classes.
The impact of these variables on marginal  cost is dramatically illustrated by a few comparisons.
Within sectors at constant abatment rates, the MAC ratio between small and large facilities can be
as high as 30:1 (e.g., TSS and COD in Food Processing).  Across sectors, MAC ratios at the
same scale and abatement rate can be as high as 20:1 (e.g., large-scale Food Processing and
Textiles for TSS).  Finally, MAC ratios in the same sector and scale class can be as high as 15:1
for 90% and 10% abatement (e.g., BOD in small-scale Paper).  The implication,  confirmed in
Section 6.4 below, is that very large savings could be realized in an emissions charge regime
which equalized the marginal 'price of pollution' across plants.
86.2 The Cost of Tighter Effluent Standards
China's current regulatory system is built around national effluent concentration standards which
can be adjusted upward by local regulators with NEPA's  perrmission. Table 3.3 illustrates the
degree of variation in existing standards, by area and water quality class.  In this section, we
analyze the effects of variation in effluent standards using Equation (5.1).  In a series of
simulations, we assume that each emissions source in the sample is required to meet a broad range
of effluent concentration standards for each pollutant. Given the existing sector, scale and
influent concentration, we use equation (5.1) to estimate the associated abatement costs for each
emissions source.  We then add across sources to get total estimated abatement cost for the 260
factories in our sample.
The results are tabulated in Table 6.2.  For this relatively small sample of factories, the cost
implications of variable standards are obviously significant. At the bottom of the table, we use
standards which reflect regulations for allowable discharges into Class D water bodies in
Guangdong Province (TSS:150, COD:400, BOD:100).  Total annual abatement costs associated
with this option are $41.9 million. At Class B settings (TSS: 100, COD: 150, BOD: 70) the cost
increases to $55.1 million. Class A settings (TSS:50, COD:50, BOD:20) escalate the costs to
$74.9 million. At the accounting interest rate of 10% which we have employed for this study, the
implied difference  in present value between the Class A and Class D options is $330 million. This
difference is large enough to warrant careful thought about the benefits associated with very strict
effluent concentration standards.
6.3 The Impact of Emissions Charges
Chinese regulators are currently discussing the advisability  of adopting a full pollution charge
system. To assess the economics of such a system, we assume alternative schedules of uniform
charges, applied throughout China 14  At each charge rate, we apply equation (5.3) plant-by-plant
to predict effluent concentration and emissions for each pollutant. We add across predicted plant-
level emissions  to get aggregate predicted emissions for each pollutant. Assuming constant
influent concentrations and waste stream volumes, we also calculate aggregate influent for each
pollutant across all factories in the sample. We then calculate aggregate percent abatement for
each pollution charge level, by pollutant, along with estimated total abatement costs.
The results, presented in Table 6.3, suggest that modest pollution charges would induce very
significant  abatement. For Suspended Solids (TSS), $1/ton induces 84% overall abatement; the
same abatement is attained for COD and BOD at $6/ton and $15/ton, respectively. As abatement
moves toward OECD rates, however, MIAC  begins escalating rapidly. To induce 99% abatement,
we estimate the necessary charges to be $45/ton for TSS and $500/ton for BOD and COD.
14 While  we impose  the assumption  of uniform charges  for this analvsis.  w-e  would  not advocate  it in practice.
China has great regional  heterogeneitv.  and appropnate  charges  would  differ across  provinces. For a related
analysis  of provincial  variations in the ceffcctlve  pollution  levv,  see Wang and Wheeler  (1996).
96.4 Cost Savings with  Emissions Charges
China is already operating a mixed regulatory system, with economic incentives to abate provided
by the pollution levy. Wang and Wheeler (1996) find that the emissions intensity of Chinese
industry has been highly responsive to variations in the effective levy across provinces and over
time.  It is therefore possible that the cost savings associated with movement to a conventional
pollution charge system would be relatively small. On the other hand, the pollution levy penalizes
only excess discharges. Up to the applicable standard, pollution is 'free'  for industrial facilities,
whereas pollution charges would apply to all emissions.
In Table 6.4, we assess the cost-saving implications of a shift to a pollution charge system.
Adding across the 370 emissions sources in our sample, we calculate total influent and effluent for
each pollutant and use the results to estimate total abatement rates.  The results for TSS, COD
and BOD are respectively 93%, 92% and 89%.  Total associated abatement costs are $47.3
million. Using Table 6.3, we determine the charge rates which would induce equivalent
abatement for each pollutant.  The relevant rates for TSS, COD and BOD are respectively $4,
$20 and $25 per ton. We use these rates along with equations (5.1) and (5.3) to determine
emissions and abatement costs for each source under the charge regime.  Adding across sources,
we arrive at an estimated total abatement cost of $12.9 million -- a 73% reduction.
This result clearly highlights the impact of variability in marginal abatement costs.  When industry
is confronted with a uniform charge, cost-minimization shifts pollution control activity toward the
least-cost abaters.  The result is an annual  difference of $34.4 million  in total abatement costs for
the 260 factories, which has a present value of $344 million. This is nearly identical to the cost
difference estimated for a shift from Class D to Class A discharge standards in Section 6.2.  The
message here is clear, and quite striking: Under a uniform emissions charge regime, China could
either realize very large abatement cost savings or enjoy far higher water quality at equivalent
cost.
7.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have used a new dataset to estimate water pollution abatement costs for Chinese
industry.  Using a joint cost function approach, we have developed marginal abatement cost
functions which relate pollutant-specific costs to treatment volume and percent abatement for
Suspended Solids, Chemical Oxygen Demand, Biological Oxygen Demand and Other Pollutants.
The quality of the data has permitted testing simpler functional forms against a full translog
specification. Our results suggest that a constant-elasticity model is appropriate for policy
analysis.
Using the econometric results, we have analyzed the cost-effectiveness of current pollution
control policy in China. Our basic conclusions are as follows:
10*  For each pollutant, marginal abatement costs exhibit very large differences by sector, scale and
degree of abatement.  Ratios of 20:1 in each dimension are not uncommon.
*  The benefits of stricter effluent standards should be weighed carefully against the costs.  For
our sample of 260 factories, a shift of discharge standards from Class D to Class A effluent
concentrations would imply a present-value difference of $330 million in abatement costs.
*  Emissions charges as low as $1.00/ton would be sufficient to induce substantial abatement of
suspended solids for cost-minimizing  factories.  Charges of $3, $15 and $30 per ton would be
sufficient to induce 90% abatement of TSS, COD and BOD, respectively.
*  The current regulatory system provides an economic incentive to abate by charging a levy on
pollution in excess of the standard. However, our results suggest that changing to a full
emissions charge system would greatly reduce abatement costs.  For the 260 factories in our
sample, the current overall abatement rate could be attained under a charge system at 73%
lower cost.  At a cost equivalent to that of the current system, uniform pollution charges
could produce much higher environmental quality.
We conclude by returning to our initial question:  Should China's leaders be worried about the
cost of stricter water pollution control?  In fact, our results suggest that more cost-effective
regulatory instruments would produce considerably better environmental quality at a lower overall
cost.  While it seems clear that significant  savings could be realized under an emissions charge
system, we should note that our simulation experiment with uniform rates is purely illustrative.
China is a large, diverse country with highly varied environmental, economic and social
conditions.  If a national emissions charge system is adopted, it would seem appropriate to give
local regulators the authority to adapt charges to local circumstances.
11Tablc 3.1
NEPA and Tianjin EPB Data on Pollution Abatement
and  Costs for 260 Factories
(Variable  Labels  from  Equation  (4.3) in Parentheses)
Abatement  Cost
Water Pollution Abatement Expenditure (C)
Equipment
Operations and Maintenance
Waste Stream Volume, Influent and EMuent
Annual Volume of Waste Water (1.) (W)
Influent (I) and Effluent (E) Concentrations in Waste Water (mg/l):
Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD)




Water  Pollution  Abatement  in Chinese  Factories
Table 3.2a:  Distribution  of Effluent and  Influent  Concentration  (mgll)
Min  Quartile  I  Quartile  2  Quartile  3  Max
TSS Effluent  0.00  43.50  93.30  199.20  10806.00
TSS Influent  0.00  155.00  567.00  1754.00  100000.00
COD Effluent  0.00  82.14  183.78  500.00  63950.00
COD Influent  0.00  344.24  850.00  1649.25  100000.00
BOD Effluent  0.00  16.77  48.90  145.00  3886.00
BOD Influent  15.88  167.93  264.00  699.80  63075.00
Other Effluent  0.00  0.04  2.98  8.64  2500.00
Other Influent  0.00  1.73  12.00  107.43  37000.00
Table 3.2b:  Distribution  of Abatement  (%)
Max  Quartile 3  Quartile 2  Quartilel  Min
TSS  100.00  94.30  80.10  55.00  0.00
COD  100.00  88.20  72.60  52.70  0.00
BOD  100.00  93.10  77.60  55.80  0.00
OTHER  100.00  100.00  100.00  94.20  0.00
13Table 3.3
Chinese  Industrial  Discharge  Standards
Table 3.3a:  Chinese Discharge  Standards  in Twvo  Areas  (mg/i)
Guanedon!  (1990)
Water  Body Class'  A  B  C  D
Discharne Scaleb  1  2  1  2  1  2
TSS  70  100  100  200  200  200  250
BOD  30  50  60  60  70  70  80
COD  100  110  130  130  150  150  200
Beiiine  (1985)
Water  Bodv Classe  A  B  C
TSS  30  50  80
Paper  & Leather  100
BOD  5  20  60
COD  15  60  100
Paper  & Leather  160
Classes refer to the protection status of the receiving water bodv.  A is for high-quality use;
C-D for low-quality uses.
bDischarge  scale is grouped into two categories:  I = < 1000 m3/d;  2 = > 1000 m3/d)
Table 3.3b:  Discharge Standards  vs. Factory  EMuent  Concentrations  (mg/I)
Standards  Effluent  Concentrations
Beiiinz!  Guanzdon2  lst Quartile  Median
TSS  80(C)  100 (B)  44  93
COD  100 (C)  200 (D)  82  184
BOD  60(C)  60(B)  17  49
Source:  NEPA
14Table 5.1
Abatement  Cost Function  Estimation  Results
5.1a:  Variable  Descriptions
LTRT  =  Log (Volume of Wastewater Treated)
LTSS  =  Log (Effluent/Influent) for TSS
LCOD  =  Log (Effluent/Influent for COD
LBOD  =  Log (Effluent/Influent) for BOD
LOTH  =  Log (Effluent/Influent) for Other Pollutants
5.1b:  Regression Results (I)
Constant Elasticity  Quadratic Scale  Partial Interactions  Full Translog
Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t
Intercept  0.884**  4.90  0.849**  4.68  0.930**  4.86  0.913**  4.51
LTRT  0.408**  12.39  0.343**  6.84  0.333**  6.43  0.332**  5.37
LTSS  -0.214**  3.96  -0.208**  3.86  0.205  1.38  0.135  0.86
LCOD  -0.272**  3.08  -0.281**  3.19  -0.484**  2.54  -0.447*  1.92
LBOD  -0.330**  2.91  -0.331**  2.93  -0.222  0.83  -0.19  0.50
LOTH  -0.108**  2.21  0. 109**  2.24  -0.042  0.40  -0.038  0.33
LTRT 2 0.015*  1.70  0.016*  1.90  0.020**  2.06
LTSS2 0.076**  3.12  0.088**  3.28
LCOD 2 0.031  0.46  0.030  0.42
LBOD2 0.070  0.65  0.071  0.66
LOTH 2 0.010  0.62  0.011  0.66
LTSS*LCOD  -0.095  1.54  -0.090  1.38
LTSS*LBOD  0.194*  1.92  0.189*  1.83
LTSS*LOTH  0.093  1.24  0.105  1.37
LCOD*LBOD  -0.137  1.63  -0.132  1.53
LCOD*LOTH  -0.017  0.33  -0.031  0.44
LBOD*LOTH  -0.164  1.43  -0.163  1.41
LTRT*LTSS  0.033  1.22
LTRT*LCOD  -0.009  0.23
LTRT*LBOD  -0.005  0.09
LTRT*LOTH  -0.006  0.24
FOOD  -1.074**  3.63  -1.060**  3.60  -1.025**  3.38  -1.019**  3.31
TEXTILES  0.481*  1.87  0.469*  1.83  0.375  1.440  0.363  1.38
OIL REFINING  1.428**  4.84  1.366**  4.51  1.124**  3.690  1.044**  3.27
CHEMICALS  0.350*  1.70  0.355*  1.73  0.328  1.610  0.282  1.35
IRON &  -2.252**  4.63  -2.224**  4.58  -2.090**  4.340  -2.072**  4.28
STEEL
# OF OBS.  327  327  327  327
R 2 0.51  0.51  0.53  0.53
CRITICAL F  2.88  2.16  1.69
155.1c:  Regression  Results  (II)
OLS  Without  LBOD  2SLS
Coefficient  t  Coefricient  t
Intercept  0.981**  5.47  0.748**  3.71
LTRT  0.400**  12.06  0.383**  10.71
LTSS  -0.203**  3.73  -0..200**  2.78
LCOD  -0.411**  5.48  -0.485**  4.16
LBOD  0.399**  3.05
LOTH  -0.094**  1.92  -0.098**  1.31
FOOD  -1.188**  4.01  -1.426**  4.31
TEXTILES  0.371  1.44  0.352*  1.35
OIL REFINING  1.270**  4.33  1.673**  4.78
CBMEICALS  0.240  1.18  0.352*  1.61
IRON &  -2.302**  4.68  -1.987**  4.12
STEEL
# OF OBS.  327  280
R2  0.50  0.52
16Table 6.1
Sectoral Marginal Abatement Cost bv Size of Facility
($US/ton)
Table 6.1a: Suspended  Solids
Small  Medium  Large
Food Processing
Rate ofAbatement
0.1  0.36  0.02  0.01
0.3  0.49  0.03  0.01
0.6  0.96  0.06  0.03
0.9  5.15  0.30  0.14
Textiles
Rate ofAbatement
0.1  0.78  0.40  0.31
0.3  1.06  0.54  0.43
0.6  2.09  1.07  0.84
0.9  11.25  5.75  4.52
Paper
Rate ofAbatement
0.1  0.10  0.05  0.02
0.3  0.13  0.06  0.03
0.6  0.26  0.13  0.06
0.9  1.38  0.67  0.32
Oil Refining
Rate ofAbatement
0.1  0.58  0.18  0.05
0.3  0.79  0.25  0.07
0.6  1.55  0.49  0.13
0.9  8.33  2.63  0.71
Chemicals
Rate of Abatement
0.1  0.12  0.04  0.02
0.3  0.16  0.05  0.02
0.6  0.32  0.10  0.04
0.9  1.70  0.54  0.23
17Table  6.lb:  COD
Small  Medium  Large
Food Processing
Rate  ofAbatement
0.1  0.35  0.02  0.01
0.3  0.48  0.03  0.01
0.6  0.97  0.06  0.03
0.9  5.65  0.33  0.16
Textiles
Rate ofAbatement
0.1  0.24  0.12  0.10
0.3  0.33  0.17  0.13
0.6  0.67  0.34  0.27
0.9  3.89  1.99  1.56
Paper
Rate ofAbatement
0.1  0.07  0.03  0.02
0.3  0.09  0.04  0.02
0.6  0.18  0.09  0.04
0.9  1.06  0.52  0.25
Oil Refining
Rate ofAbatement
0.1  1.47  0.47  0.13
0.3  2.03  0.64  0.17
0.6  4.13  1.31  0.35
0.9  24.10  7.61  2.04
Chemicals
Rate  ofAbatement
0.1  0.50  0.16  0.07
0.3  0.69  0.22  0.09
0.6  1.41  0.45  0.19
0.9  8.24  2.60  1.11
18Table 6.1c: BOD
Small  Medium  Large
Food  Processing
Rate ofAbarement
0.10  0.86  0.05  0.02
0.30  1.20  0.07  0.03
0.60  2.53  0.15  0.07
0.90  15.98  0.93  0.44
Textiles
Rate ofAbatement
0.10  1.01  0.52  0.41
0.30  1.41  0.72  0.57
0.60  2.97  1.52  1.19
0.90  18.76  9.60  7.54
Paper
Rate ofAbatement
0.10  0.26  0.13  0.06
0.30  0.37  0.18  0.09
0.60  0.77  0.38  0.18
0.90  4.88  2.38  1.15
6.1d: Treatment Scale by Sector
Facility Scale*
Small  Medium  Large
Food  Processing  0.16  19.55  68.90
Textiles  21.73  67.40  101.25
Paper  32.78  110.19  377.18
Oil Refining  7.65  53.60  493.43
Chemicals  1.91  13.42  56.50
* Measured  in 10,000  tons of wastewater  treated
19Table  6.2
Abatement  Cost Implica  ions of Variable  Effluent  Standards:
260 Chinese  Factories  (SUS Million)
TSS  COD  BOD
Standard  Standard  Standard  Overall
(mg/i)  Total  Cost  (mg/l)  Total  Cost  (mg/l)  Total  Cost  Total Cost
50  21.1  50  35.6  20  18.2  74.9
60  20.1  60  33.9  30  15.9  69.9
70  19.4  80  31.3  40  14.4  65.1
80  18.7  100  29.4  50  13.3  61.4
90  18.0  120  27.9  60  12.5  58.4
100  17.5  150  25.8  70  11.9  55.1
110  17.0  200  23.5  80  11.4  51.9
120  15.0  250  22.1  90  10.9  48.0
130  14.6  300  20.3  100  10.6  45.5
140  14.3  350  18.8  110  10.2  43.4
150  14.1  400  17.9  120  9.9  41.9
20Table 6.3
Simulation Results for 260 Chinese Factories:
Emissions  Cbarges, Pollution Abatement, and Costs
TSS Removal as a  COD Removal as a  BOD Removal as a  Predicted Total Cost (in
CHARGE  Percentage of Total  Percentage of Total  Percentage of Total  1,000 US S)
(S/Ton)  TSS Generated  COD Generated  BOD Generated
0.20  0.58  0.23  0.01  9351
0.40  0.72  0.35  0.06  9493
0.60  0.78  0.42  0.13  9624
0.80  0.82  0.51  0.21  9736
1.00  0.84  0.56  0.26  9831
1.20  0.86  0.60  0.30  9917
1.40  0.87  0.63  0.33  9994
1.60  0.88  0.66  0.38  10070
1.80  0.89  0.68  0.42  10148
2.00  0.89  0.70  0.45  10226
2.20  0.90  0.71  0.48  10303
2.40  0.90  0.73  0.50  10375
2.60  0.91  0.74  0.53  10443
2.80  0.91  0.75  0.55  10510
3.00  0.92  0.76  0.57  10577
3.20  0.92  0.77  0.58  10641
3.40  0.92  0.78  0.60  10704
3.60  0.92  0.78  0.61  10764
3.80  0.93  0.79  0.62  10823
4.00  0.93  0.79  0.64  10880
4.20  0.93  0.80  0.65  10936
4.40  0.93  0.81  0.66  10991
4.60  0.94  0.81  0.67  11048
4.80  0.94  0.81  0.67  11104
5.00  0.94  0.82  0.68  11161
6.00  0.95  0.84  0.72  11431
7.00  0.95  0.85  0.75  11682
8.00  0.95  0.86  0.77  11921
9.00  0.96  0.87  0.78  12151
10.00  0.96  0.88  0.80  12378
15.00  0.97  0.90  0.84  13391
20.00  0.98  0.92  0.87  14260
25.00  0.98  0.93  0.88  15042
30.00  0.98  0.94  0.90  15786
35.00  0.98  0.94  0.91  16487
40.00  0.98  0.95  0.92  17146
45.00  0.99  0.95  0.92  17770
50.00  0.99  0.96  0.93  18363
100.00  0.99  0.97  0.96  23320
500.00  1.00  0.99  0.99  45298
1000.00  1.00  1.00  0.99  62596
5000.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  141514
21Table 6.4
Total Abatement  Costs:  Current  System vs.





TSS  0.93  4.00
COD  0.92  20.00
BOD  0.89  25.00
Total  Cost  47.3  12.9
(SUS mil.)
227. REFERENCES
CRAES (Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences), 1994, Proposalfor  the
Policy Study on the Industrial Pollution Control and Investment in China, Beijing,
November
Gray, W., and R. Shadbegian, 1993, "Environmental Regulation and Manufacturing
Productivity at the Plant Level," Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau,
Discussion Paper No. CES 93-6
Hamilton, M., 1994, "Selling  Pollution Rights Cuts the Cost of Cleaner Air," Washington
Post, August 24, p. Fl
Hartman, R., M. Singh and D. Wheeler, 1995, The Cost of Air Pollution Abatement,
Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank
Hettige, M., M. Huq, S. Pargal and D. Wheeler, 1995, Determinants of Pollution
Abatement in South and Southeast Asia, paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the
American Economic AssoJiation, Washington, D.C., January
Mundle, S., S. Mehta and U. Shankar, 1994, "Incentives and Regulation for Pollution
Abatement, With an Application to Waste Water Treatment," presented to the 50th
Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, August 25-29, Harvard
Porter, Michael, 1991, "America's Green Strategy," Sciemtific  American, April, p. 168
Oates, W., K. Palmer and P. Portney, 1993, "Environmental Regulation and International
Competitiveness: Thinking About the Porter Hypothesis," Resources for the Future
(mimeo.)
Wheeler, D., 1992, The Economics of Industrial Pollution Control: An International
Perspective, Industry and Energy Department Working Paper, World Bank.
Wang, H. and D. Wheeler, 1996, Pricing Industrial Pollution in China: An Econometric
Analysis of the Levy System, Policy Research Department, March (mimeo.)
Xu, Xiping, Jun Gao, Douglas Dockery and Yude Chen, 1994, "Air Pollution and Daily
Mortality in Residential Areas of Beijing, China," Archives of Environmental Health,
49(4), 216-22
Xu, Z.Y., X. Xu, C.H. Chen, T. Kjellstrom et. al., 1995, "Air Pollution and Daily
Mortality in Shenyang" (mimeo.)
23Policy Research Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1611  Economic Analysis for Health  Jeffrey S  Hammer  May 1996  C. Bernardo
Projects  37699
WPS1612  Stock Market and Investment: The  Cherian Samuel  May 1996  C  Samuel
Signaling Role of the Market  30802
WPS1613  Does Public Capital Crown Out  Luis Serven  May 1996  E. Khine
Private Capital? Evidence from India  37471
WPS1614  Growth, Globalization,  and Gains  Thomas W. Hertel  May 1996  A. Kitson-Walters
from the Uruguay Round  Christian F. Bach  323947
Betina Dimaranan
Will Martin
WPS1615  Issues in Measuring and Modeling  Martin Ravallion  June 1996  P. Sader
Poverty  33902
WPS1616  Transient Poverty in Rural China  Jyotsna Jalan  June 1996  P. Sader
Martin Ravallion  33902
WPS1617  Why is Unemployment Low in the  Simon Commander  June 1996  L. Alsegaf
Former Soviet Union? Enterprise  Andrei Tolstopiatenko  36442
Restructuring and the Structure
of Compensation
WPS1618  Analytical Aspects of the Debt  Stijn Claessens  June 1996  R  Velasquez
Problems of Heavily Indebted  Enrica Detragiache  39290
Poor Countries  Ravi Kanbur
Peter Wickham
WPS1619  Capital Flows to Latin America  Sara Calvo  June 1996  M. Gomez
Is There Evidence of Contagion  Carmen Reinhart  38451
Effects?
WPS1620  Bank Insolvencies  Cross-country  Gerard Caprio, Jr.  July 1996  B.  Moore
Experience  38526
WPS1621  The Sustainability of African Debt  Daniel Cohen  July 1996  S. King-Watson
33730
WPS1622  Capital Control Liberalization and  Ross Levine  July 196  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Stock Market Development  Sara Zervos  38526
WPS1623  Environmental Degradation and  Deon Filmer  July 1996  S. Fallon
the Demand for Children  Searching  Lant Pritchett  38009
for the Vicious Circle
WPS1624  Structural Adjustment, Ownership  Luca Barbone  July 1996  C. Pelegrin
Transformation, and Size in Polish  Domenico Marchetti, Jr.  85067
Industry  Stefano PaternostroPolicy Research Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1625  Restructuring and Taxation in  Simon Commander  July 1996  L. Alsegaf
Transition  Economies  Andrei Tolstopiatenko  36442
WPS1626  Partners or Predators? The Impact  Jeffrey D. Lewis  July 1996  N. Mensah
of Regional Trade Liberalization on  Sherman Robinson  Q4-058
Indonesia
WPS1627  Tradable Water Rights: A Property  Paul Holden  July 1996  P  Mendez
Rights Approach to Resolving Water  Mateen Thobani  38893
Shortages and Promoting Investment
WPS1628  Globalization: A New Role for  Shigeru Otsubo  July 1996  J. Queen
Developing Countries in an Integrating  33740
World
WPS1629  Form of Ownership and Financial  Fabio Schiantarelli  July 1996  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Constraints  Alessandro Sembenelli  38526
WPS1630  Water Pollution Abatement by  Susmita Dasgupta  August 1996  S. Dasgupta
Chinese Industry: Cost Estimates  Maiinul Huq  32679
and Policy Implications  David Wheeler
Chonghua Zhang
WPS1631  Bank Regulation and the Network  Patrick Honohan  August 1996  P. Infante
Paradigm: Policy Implications for  Dimitri Vittas  37642
Developing and Transition Economies